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Abstract. In this paper, we consider economies with (possibly endogenous)
solvency constraints under uncertainty. Constrained inefficiency corresponds
to a feasible redistribution yielding a welfare improvement beginning from ev-
ery contingency reached by the economy. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass [10])
completely characterizes constrained inefficiency. This criterion involves only
observable prices and requires low interest rates in the long-run, exactly as
in economies with overlapping generations. In addition, when quantitative
limits to liabilities arise from participation constraints, a feasible welfare im-
provement, subject to participation, coincides with the introduced notion of
constrained inefficiency.
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1. Introduction
Models with debt constraints have been used to explain the time series of output,
asset prices and interest rates (Scheinkman and Weiss [24]), to understand and
quantify the size of precautionary savings (Aiyagari [2]), to derive the optimal
quantity of money (Bewley [7]), or public debt (Woodford [25]), and to prove the
existence of asset bubbles (Scheinkman and Weiss [24], Kocherlakota [18], Santos
and Woodford [23]). More recently, there has been a great deal of research on the
endogenous determination of debt constraints, assuming limited enforcement and
incentive constraints (among others, Kehoe and Levine [16], Kocherlakota [19] and
Alvarez and Jermann [5]). These studies have reconsidered and quantified the same
issues addressed in previous models with exogenous debt limits, as well as other
issues, such as debt sustainability under limited contract enforcement (Eaton and
Gersovitz [14], Bulow and Rogoff [9], Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15]).
In this paper, we address the welfare properties of competitive equilibria with
(possibly endogenous) debt limits. In particular, we provide a full characteriza-
tion of constrained inefficiency by means of a sort of Cass Criterion (Cass [10]).
This criterion, which was developed for capital theory and overlapping generations
economies, is based on the observation of equilibrium prices only and is independent
of the specific nature of debt constraints.
We are grateful to Paolo Siconolfi, Luca Panaccione and Herakles Polemarchakis for helpful
comments and observations. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Italian
Ministry of University and Research (PRIN 2006). All remaining misunderstandings, omissions
and errors are our own responsibility.
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Debt limits prevent the economy from attaining a first best because individuals
are unable to exploit all trading opportunities and disparities in subjective evalu-
ations of risk might remain at equilibrium. The interesting issue is whether com-
petitive equilibria are constrained optimal, that is, whether there may be benefits
from redistributions under the condition that debt constraints cannot be removed.
This notion of optimality is particularly relevant when debt limits are endogenous,
since, most likely, policy intervention fails in sidestepping the incentive constraints
from which debt limits arise. Evidently, the failure of constrained optimality entails
some distortions in the intertemporal allocation of resources, which we may define
as long-run inefficiency, or lack of transversality.
We are not the first to study the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in
the presence of debt limits. Having developed a model where these limits arise
from participation constraints (or individual rationality constraints), Kehoe and
Levine [16] are able to provide a natural definition of constrained optimality. In
their model, individual rationality is satisfied when individuals have no incentive
to default, in which case they are excluded from contingent claim markets trading
and their assets are seized. An allocation is constrained optimal when it is not
Pareto dominated by any other allocation satisfying both resource and individual
rationality. Alvarez and Jermann [5] study a similar model using a different equi-
librium concept. Namely, they impose quantity limits on asset positions exploiting
the notion of not-too-tight debt constraints. The latter are essentially equal to the
debt levels at which individuals are just indifferent between participating to the
asset market and reverting to autarchy. In a simple framework, competitive non-
autarchic equilibria, as defined by Alvarez and Jermann [5], are constrained optimal
if and only if the value of the aggregate endowment is finite or, according to their
terminology, when high implied interest rates prevail at equilibrium.
To assess the welfare implications of debt constraints, we consider competitive
equilibria at arbitrarily specified debt, or solvency, constraints. No particular as-
sumptions are imposed on the nature of solvency constraints, as long as they might
be represented as quantitative limits to debt holdings. Our notion of constrained
Pareto optimality differs from the one adopted by Alvarez and Jermann [5] in
the following sense: an allocation is constrained inefficient if there exists an al-
location producing a welfare improvement among the set of allocations satisfying
resource feasibility and general participation constraints. The latter are defined as
the condition that the welfare improving allocation guarantees at least the same
expected utility, from any date-event on, than the expected utility generated by
some specified reservation utilities. This sort of inefficiency, which encompasses the
specification of Alvarez and Jermann [5], is referred to as constrained inefficient at
given reservation utilities.
In order to verify the efficiency of competitive equilibria with debt constraints,
we impose that these are not-too-tight with respect to given reservation utilities,
in the sense proposed by Alvarez and Jermann [5]. Namely, the latter must be
such that a debt constraint is binding for any individual at a date-event if and only
if he is just indifferent between participating in the asset market or enjoying the
reservation utility at that date-event. In this case, we say that debt constraints are
consistent with reservation utilities.
When reservation utilities are evaluated at initial endowments of individuals,
our notion of constrained efficiency coincides with that of Kehoe and Levine [16]
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and of Alvarez and Jermann [5]. However, our notion is consistent with several
other modeling strategies. Namely, we can specify the reservation utilities as in
Bulow and Rogoff [9] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15], where, in case of default,
individuals are permitted to participate to the asset market by holding non-negative
net positions. Although we consider these cases as extensions of our model, we
are mainly interested in reservation utilities deriving from planned consumption at
equilibrium. In this case, an allocation is constrained inefficient if there is a resource
feasible allocation producing sequential benefits at all date-events with respect to
the individuals’ consumption plans that are optimal at the given equilibrium prices.
The equilibrium allocation is, then, called simply constrained inefficient.
There are at least two reasons why we think that our notion of inefficiency is
interesting. The first is that, by defining the efficiency properties of the model
with reference to arbitrary reservation utilities, we can possibly take into account
different theories about the punishment suffered by an individual after default, as
long as he is unable to affect the value of his reservation utilities with his actions. For
example, differently from both Kehoe and Levine [16] or Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15],
one may think it is more realistic to assume that bankruptcy implies exclusion from
asset markets for a limited number of periods only, or impose collateral requirements
(see Phelan [22], Kiyotaki and Moore [17], Lustig [21], Krueger and Uhlig [20] for
different formulations of the borrowers’ outside options). The second reason to be
interested in our notion of constrained inefficiency is that we are able to provide a
test for inefficiency which is, in some sense, independent of the different formulations
of the borrowers’ outside options. In particular, we show that an equilibrium with
debt constraints is constrained inefficient (at planned consumption) if and only if
it is constrained inefficient at given reservation utilities, provided that the debt
constraints are consistent with these reservation utilities. In other words, although
our test of inefficiency is derived with respect to planned (equilibrium) consumption,
it can be extended to both Alvarez and Jermann [5] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15].
Hence, the nature of constrained inefficiency at equilibrium with consistent debt
constraints is basically that captured by our notion of constrained inefficiency.
We show that, under relatively mild restrictions, constrained inefficiency cor-
responds to low implied interest rates. The exact domain of low interest rates is
captured by a sort of Modified Cass Criterion, which is equivalent to the existence
of a sequence of bounded positive transfers of commodities, {vt}, satisfying, for
some ρ in (0, 1),
ρEtpt+1vt+1 ≥ ptvt,
where {pt} is the sequence of Arrow-Debreu prices, or contingent claims prices.
These transfers are hypothetical as they need not coincide with those producing
the welfare improvement, which might be largely more dispersed. Importantly, in-
efficiency can be equivalently characterized by means of the positive linear operator
defined by
T (v)t =
1
pt
Etpt+1vt+1.
It exactly corresponds to the existence of a real eigenvalue, of such a linear operator,
larger than the unity, with associated bounded eigenvector. This is reminiscence of
the Dominant Root, or Perron-Frobenius, Characterization (Aiyagari and Peled [3])
for recursive equilibria in stochastic overlapping generations economies. Hence, our
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characterization is tight, as it exploits the same criterion for possibly non-recursive
equilibria.
It should be noticed that, according to this finding, high implied interest rates
is not a necessary condition for constrained optimality, in contrast with a claim in
Alvarez and Jermann [5]. In fact, under non-stationary endowments, we provide an
example of a non-autarchic constrained efficient allocation, according to the notion
adopted by these authors, violating the high interest rates assumption.
An important virtue of any test of long-run inefficiency based on the observation
of prices, as the one proposed in this paper, is that, in principle, it is suitable for
empirical work. Tests of various versions of the Cass Criterion have been discussed
with reference to stochastic overlapping generations economies with production. For
example, Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser [1] provide a version of the Cass
Criterion called Net Dividend Criterion and they conclude that the US economy
is dynamically efficient. However, Barbie, Hagedorn and Kaul [6] point out that a
correct implementation of this test requires that net dividends be computed for all
potential paths following a given history of states. Then, they propose a different
criterion for dynamic efficiency, introduced by Zilcha [26], based on the expected
rental rate of capital and conclude in favor of dynamic efficiency. However, they also
stress that, under uncertainty, dynamic efficiency is only a necessary, not a sufficient
condition for interim Pareto optimality. The absence of capital overaccumulation
may still allow for distortions of consumptions across states and time periods.
Difficulties and potentials for testing long-run efficiency in pure exchange over-
lapping generations economies with uncertainty and sequentially complete (and in-
complete) markets are discussed in Chattopadhyay [11] and Bloise and Calciano [8].
The latter contribution considers economies where agents’ time horizon is bounded
but arbitrarily long and proposes a test for efficiency formally identical to the one
derived in this paper. It is suggested that this test is more easily applicable in
empirical work because of its simpler formulation.
The proposed characterization of constrained inefficiency may help to clarify the
analogy between economies with debt constraints and economies with overlapping
generations. Although the two economies have markedly different institutional
features, long-run inefficiency of competitive equilibria can be understood, in both
cases, as a failure of the transversality condition. Whereas in the overlapping
generations model this condition fails because agents have a positive fraction of
aggregate endowments for a finite number of periods, in the model with borrowing
constraints the same condition fails because, at equilibrium, agents are not credit
constrained for a finite number of date-events only. Our contribution shows that a
unique test for dynamic efficiency applies for both type of models. In particular, we
clarify that dynamic efficiency is not restricted to the case of high implied interest
rates (i.e., aggregate endowments having a finite value), but it is also verified when
implied interest rates are neither high nor low.
Market incompleteness due to debt limits may generate rational asset bubbles
under additional hypothesis (see Santos and Woodford [23]). The basic intuition
is that, when credit constraints are binding infinitely often, competitive equilibria
may be supported by equilibrium prices at which individuals’ endowments have
infinite value (non high interest rates). The connection between debt limits, non
high interest rates and rational asset bubbles (existence of unbacked public debt in
positive net supply) is explored in Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15]. Our analysis may be
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used to supplement these results by showing that, although the existence of asset
bubbles in an economy with a finite number of agents (subject to debt limits) may
be associated to long run inefficiency (low interest rates), this is by no means a
necessary condition.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the environment and the
basic assumptions of the model. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the notion of constrained
inefficiency. Section 5 introduces the equilibrium concept and the concept of price
support. Section 6 provides the characterization of constrained inefficiency in terms
of the equilibrium prices. Section 7 shows how we can extend our characterization
to any model where debt limits are consistent with reservation utilities and dis-
cusses the relation between our analysis and the analysis in [5]. Finally, we present
an example in appendix A and a complement to Kehoe and Levine’s [16] Second
Welfare Theorem in appendix B. All proofs are collected in appendix C.
2. Fundamentals
2.1. Time and uncertainty. Time and uncertainty are represented by an event-
tree S, a countably infinite set, endowed with ordering º. For a date-event σ in S,
t (σ) in T = {0, 1, 2, . . . , t, . . .} denotes its date and
σ+ = {τ ∈ S (σ) : t (τ) = t (σ) + 1}
is the non-empty finite set of all immediate direct successors, where
S (σ) = {τ ∈ S : τ º σ} .
The initial date-event is φ in S, with t (φ) = 0, that is, σ º φ for every σ in S.
This construction is canonical (Debreu [13, Chapter 7]).
2.2. Vector space notation and terminology. As far as notation and termi-
nology for vector spaces are concerned, we basically follow Aliprantis and Border
[4, Chapters 5-8]. Consider the vector space of all real maps on S, RS , endowed
with the canonical (product) ordering. An element v of RS is positive (respectively,
strictly positive) if vσ ≥ 0 for every σ in S (respectively, vσ > 0 for every σ in S).
For an element v of RS , v+ in RS and v− in RS are, respectively, its positive part
and its negative part, so that v = v+−v− in RS and |v| = v++v− in RS . Also, for
an arbitrary collection
{
vj
}
j∈J of elements of R
S , its supremum and its infimum
in RS , if they exist, are denoted, respectively, by∨
j∈J
vj and
∧
j∈J
vj .
Finally, the positive cone of any (Riesz) vector subspace F of RS is {v ∈ F : v ≥ 0}.
2.3. Commodity space. There exists a single commodity that is traded and con-
sumed at every date-event. The commodity space is L, the (Riesz) vector space of
all bounded real maps on S. The vector space L is endowed with the supremum
norm given by
‖v‖ = inf {λ > 0 : |v| ≤ λu} ,
where here u denotes the unit of L.
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2.4. Preferences. There is a finite set J of individuals. For every individual i in
J , the consumption space Xi is the positive cone of L. Though more general pref-
erences can be encompassed in our analysis, it simplifies to assume time additively
separable utilities. Preferences of individual i in J on Xi are represented by
U i
(
xi
)
=
∑
σ∈S
piiσu
i
(
xiσ
)
,
where pii is a strictly positive order-continuous linear functional on L and ui :
R+ → R is a smooth, smoothly strictly increasing and smoothly strictly concave
per-period utility function. For every date-event σ in S, let
U iσ
(
xi
)
=
1
piiσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piiτu
i
(
xiτ
)
,
so that
U iσ
(
xi
)
= ui
(
xiσ
)
+
1
piiσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piiτU
i
τ
(
xi
)
.
Finally, we assume that there exists a sufficiently small 1 > η > 0 satisfying, for
every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
(ui) piiσ ≥ η
∑
σ∈S(σ)
piiτ .
This hypothesis imposes uniform impatience across individuals at interior consump-
tion plans.
2.5. Allocation. An allocation x is an element of X =
∏
i∈J X
i. An allocation x
in X is interior if there exists λ > 0 such that∧
i∈J
xi ≥ λu,
where here u denotes the unit of L. The hypothesis of interiority is stronger than
necessary and is maintained only to simplify presentation.
2.6. Subjective prices. For an individual i in J , at an interior consumption plan
xi in Xi, the subjective price is pi is an element of P i, the set of all strictly positive
order-continuous linear functional on L, satisfying, at every consumption plan zi
in Xi,
(sp) U i
(
zi
)− U i (xi) ≤∑
σ∈S
piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
)
.
Subjective prices exist under the maintained hypotheses on preferences at interior
consumption plans. Indeed, for every individual i in J ,(
piσ
)
σ∈S =
(
piσ∂u
i
(
xiσ
))
σ∈S .
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2.7. Stationarity. In part of the analysis, we restrict attention to stationary
economies, rendering this restriction explicit when it occurs. An economy is sta-
tionary if uncertainty can be represented as a Markov process over a finite state
space and preferences are measurable with respect to this state space. Formally,
for some finite state space, S,
S =
⋃
t∈T
St,
where St denotes the set of histories of length t in T . (The initial history φ in S
is given by some state s0 in S.) This induces an obvious finite partition (Ss)s∈S
of S, given by the identification of every σ = (s0, s1, . . . , st(σ)) in S with the last
state st(σ) in S appearing in the given history. Stationarity of the economy requires
that, for every individual i in J , the map
σ 7→
(
piiτ
piiσ
)
τ∈σ+
be measurable with respect to the finite partition (Ss)s∈S of S. Finally, in a
stationary economy, an allocation x in X is stationary if it is measurable with
respect to the finite partition (Ss)s∈S of S.
3. Inefficiency
An allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in X if,
for every individual i in J ,
U i
(
zi
)− U i (xi) ≥ 0
and, for some individual i in J ,
U i
(
zi
)− U i (xi) > 0.
To introduce a general notion of constrained inefficiency, we allow for participation
constraints at arbitrarily given reservation utilities. By varying reservation utilities,
this serves to capture different notions of constrained inefficiency. We then restrict
attention to reservation utilities induced by planned consumptions and show that
this is in fact the only relevant specification when debt constraints are consistent
with reservation utilities.
Given reservation utilities ν in V , the vector space RS×J , we define the set
Xpc (ν) of all allocations z in X satisfying, for every individual i in J , at every
date-event σ in S,
(pc) U iσ
(
zi
)− νiσ ≥ 0.
This is the set of allocations z in X fulfilling a sort of participation constraint when
reservation utilities are given at values ν in V . By progressive specification, given
an allocation e in X, we define the set Xpc (e) of all allocations z in X satisfying,
for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,
(pc) U iσ
(
zi
)− U iσ (ei) ≥ 0.
This is the set of allocations z in X fulfilling a sort of participation constraint when
reservation utilities are induced by allocation e in X, that is, allocations producing
higher utility for all individuals beginning from any date-event with respect to the
reference allocation.
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An allocation x in X is constrained inefficient at reservation utilities ν in V if
it is Pareto dominated by an allocation z in Xpc (ν) satisfying
(cf)
∑
i∈J
zi ≤
∑
i∈J
xi.
By progressive specification, an allocation x in X is constrained inefficient at al-
location e in X if it is constrained inefficient at reservation utilities induced by
allocation e in X. Finally, an allocation x is X is simply constrained inefficient if
it is constrained inefficient at allocation x in X.
The introduced notion of constrained inefficiency is strengthened in part of the
analysis. Strong inefficiency occurs when, along some subtree of the economy, a wel-
fare improving redistribution, satisfying participation constraints, is feasible even
though a constant (however small) share of the aggregate endowment is destroyed.
This redistributions, in addition, leaves consumptions unaltered in the remaining
part of the economy. Formally, an allocation x in X is strongly constrained inef-
ficient at reservation utilities ν in V if, for some non-empty subset F of S such
that
(t) σ 6∈ F if and only if F ∩ S (σ) = ∅,
it is Pareto dominated by an allocation z in Xpc (ν) satisfying, for some ² > 0,
(sf-1) ²uF +
∑
i∈J
zi ≤
∑
i∈J
xi
and
(sf-2) ²
∑
i∈J
∣∣zi − xi∣∣ ≤ uF ,
where uF denotes the unit of the vector space
LF = {v ∈ L : vσ = 0 for every σ ∈ (S/F)} .
Again, by progressive specification, an allocation x in X is strongly constrained
inefficient at allocation e in X if it is constrained inefficient at reservation utilities
induced by allocation e in X. Finally, an allocation x is X is simply strongly
constrained inefficient if it is constrained inefficient at allocation x in X.
Strong inefficiency is meant to capture robust welfare losses occurring at equilib-
rium. In a tradition of general equilibrium (Debreu [12]), a measure of inefficiency
is given by the coefficient of resource utilization, that is, by the largest share of the
aggregate endowment whose destruction is consistent with a feasible welfare im-
proving redistribution. Strong inefficiency occurs when this measure of inefficiency
is positive. Over an infinite horizon, however, inefficiency might persist even though
the mentioned measure of inefficiency vanishes. Though we do not explore this mat-
ter in depth, a non-strong inefficiency corresponds to the circumstance of benefits
from the redistribution vanishing over time and, typically, of allocation approach-
ing a constrained optimum at infinity. Finally, it is worth remarking that strong
and canonical constrained inefficiency coincide if attention is limited to stationary
allocations (§4).
Our main interest is for constrained inefficiency at planned consumptions. Con-
strained inefficiency at initial endowments is introduced for a comparison with
Kehoe and Levine [16] and Alvarez and Jermann [5]. Constrained inefficiency at
particular reservation utilities serves to encompass the formulation of Hellwig and
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Lorenzoni [15]. The first is suitable for a general characterization at any speci-
fication of debt constraints. The other two require a consistent specification of
debt constraints. As far as our characterization is concerned, we clarify the exact
differences and analogies in depth later on (§7).
4. Stationarity
We here show that, under the hypothesis of stationarity, every constrained in-
efficient allocation, among stationary allocations, is also strongly constrained inef-
ficient. This might be regarded as a digression to ascertain the loss in generality
induced by the strong form rather than the canonical form of inefficiency. Station-
arity, indeed, ensures the existence of uniformly positive benefits from the welfare
improving redistribution at constrained inefficient allocations.
Proposition 1 (Strongly versus canonical constrained inefficiency). In a stationary
economy, a stationary interior allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by a station-
ary allocation z in Xpc (x), satisfying
∑
i∈J z
i ≤ ∑i∈J xi, only if it is strongly
constrained inefficient.
The underlying logic can be illustrated as follows. At stationary allocations,
inefficiency entails the comparison of finitely many variations in utility across date-
events. In addition, by strict convexity of preferences, at no loss of generality, if
the redistribution leaves utility unaltered at some date-event, then it also leaves
consumptions unaltered at all succeeding date-events. Hence, a slight contraction
of consumptions, at all date-events at which the redistribution occurs, preserves
the strict increase in utility. This leaves uniformly positive quantities of resources
undistributed at all date-events along some subtree of the economy.
5. Equilibrium
Individuals participate into financial markets, represented as a complete spec-
trum of elementary Arrow securities. However, their holdings of securities are
restricted by quantitative limits. The nature of such debt, or solvency, constraints
is irrelevant for the purpose of our analysis, insofar as consumption and financial
plans of individuals do not bear any direct effect on debt constraints. In particular,
the construction is consistent with that of Alvarez and Jermann [5] and of Hellwig
and Lorenzoni [15], as well as with that of Bewley [7] (except for the fact that the
formulation of Bewley [7] requires a single risk-less security, instead of a full set of
elementary Arrow securities, available at every date-event).
At every date-event, simple Arrow securities are traded subject to solvency, or
debt constraints. A price p is an element of
P =
{
p ∈ RS : pσ > 0 for every σ ∈ S
}
.
Prices are expressed in present values and are comparable with Arrow-Debreu
prices, or contingent prices, or state prices. Relevantly, prices need not assign fi-
nite values to (bounded) consumption plans over the entire infinite horizon. Thus,
the duality between price and commodity spaces might fail, as in economies of
overlapping generations.
Debt constraints are quantitative limits to liabilities held by individuals at non-
initial date-events. For an individual i in J , debt constraints f i are an element
of
F i =
{
f i ∈ RS : f iσ ≥ 0 for every non-initial σ ∈ S
}
.
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Across individuals, debt constraints f are elements of F . Notice that, as debt
constraints are positive at non-initial date-events, saving is unrestricted, though
borrowing might be inhibited by debt limits. In addition, to the only purpose of
simplifying notation, the initial value of debt constraints serves to represent initial
claims, or liabilities, held by individuals.
At price p in P , for an initial endowment of commodities ei in Xi and debt
constraints f i in F i, the budget set of individual i in J is given by
Bip
(
ei, f i
)
=
xi ∈ Xi : ∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ + pσ
(
xiσ − eiσ
) ≤ pσviσ for some vi ∈ V i (f i)
 ,
where
V i
(
f i
)
=
{
vi ∈ RS : vi + f i ≥ 0, with viφ + f iφ = 0
}
.
The set V i
(
f i
)
represents allowed financial plans. These are restricted by limits
to debt and by given initial claims, or liabilities, both captured by f i in F i.
Debt constraints reflect solvency requirements. Under perfect financial markets,
solvency is guaranteed whenever debt constraints do not exceed the present value
of future endowment. However, when debt might not be honored, debt constraints
serve to prevent incentives to default. Alvarez and Jermann [5] assume that, when
default occurs, an individual is excluded from financial markets. Hellwig and Loren-
zoni [15], instead, postulate that individuals are prohibited to borrow, though they
might participate into financial markets for lending. Bewley [7] simply excludes
borrowing and introduces positive outside money. Though the specific nature of
debt constraints varies across all such instances, solvency requirements are specified
as quantitative limits to the amount of liabilities held by individuals, so that they
are all consistent with our representation of budget sets.
We are only concerned with prices that can be observed at equilibrium for some
debt constraints and some initial endowments of commodities. Thus, the only
relevant feature of equilibrium is optimality of consumption plans for individuals
(that is, a sort of price support). A preliminary observation shows that it suf-
fices to restrict attention to consumption plans that are optimal, for some debt
constraints, when they are distributed to individuals as initial endowments. The
logic is straightforward. If a consumption plan is optimal, it is sustained by some
financial plan that satisfies some debt constraints. Thus, any net variation of this
financial plan, consistent with given debt constraints, cannot yield higher utility. It
follows that the consumption plan remains optimal when it corresponds to the ini-
tial endowment and debt constraints are given as the sum of initial debt constraints
and the optimal financial plan. Clearly, in this transformation, saving and lending
are to be interpreted as net positions, corresponding to variations with respect to
the initial financial plan. For instance, if initial debt constraints prohibit borrowing
(as in Bewley [7]), a negative net position, when the consumption plan is given as
initial endowment, corresponds to a reduction of saving.
Proposition 2 (Price support). Given a price p in P , for every
(
ei, gi
)
in Xi×F i,
a consumption plan xi in Xi is U i-optimal in the budget set Bip
(
ei, gi
)
only if, for
some debt constraints f i in F i, it is U i-optimal in the budget set Bip
(
xi, f i
)
.
An allocation x in X is supported by price p in P at debt-constraints f in F
if, for every individual i in J , the consumption plan xi in Xi is U i-optimal in
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the budget constrain Bp
(
xi, f i
)
. An allocation x in X is supported (respectively,
non-trivially supported) by price p in P if it is supported by price p in P at some
debt-constraints f in F (respectively, at some debt constraints f in F satisfying,
at every non-initial date-event σ in S, ∑i∈J f iσ > 0). Non-trivial support requires
that, at every date-event, some individual is allowed to borrow (i.e., to reduce
savings), so ruling out fundamentally autarchic equilibria.
Price support admits a first-order characterization based on elementary arbi-
trage arguments, as in Alvarez and Jermann [5]. First, for every individual, the
subjective evaluation of transfers at succeeding date-events cannot exceed their
market evaluation (foc-1). Second, whenever an individual is allowed to borrow
against income at some succeeding date-event, subjective and market evaluations
need coincide (foc-2). These necessary conditions are also sufficient for optimality,
provided that boundedness of debt constraints ensures transversality.
Proposition 3 (First-order characterization). An interior allocation x in X is
supported by price p in P at debt-constraints f in F only if, at every date-event σ
in S,
(foc-1)
∨
i∈J
(
piτ
piσ
)
τ∈σ+
≤
(
pτ
pσ
)
τ∈σ+
and
(foc-2)
∑
τ∈σ+
(
piτ
piσ
)
f iτ =
∑
τ∈σ+
(
pτ
pσ
)
f iτ ,
where, for every individual i in J , pi in P i is the subjective price at interior con-
sumption plan xi in Xi. Furthermore, an interior allocation x in X is supported by
price p in P at bounded debt-constraints f in F if, at the initial date-event φ in S,
fφ = 0 and, at every date-event σ in S, conditions (foc-1)-(foc-2) are satisfied.
6. Characterization
We here provide an equivalent characterization of constrained inefficiency, at
planned consumptions, in terms of supporting prices. In particular, we show that
prices reveal this sort of inefficiency independently of the nature of debt constraints.
This characterization exploits a Modified Cass Criterion, exactly as in economies of
overlapping generations. The Modified Cass Criterion is a variation of the original
criterion proposed by Cass [10] for capital theory and was initially introduced by
Bloise and Calciano [8] for stochastic overlapping generations economies.
A price p in P satisfies the Modified Cass Criterion if there exists a non-null
positive element v of L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
This criterion admits equivalent specifications in terms of weighted sum of the
reciprocals of prices and of dominant root (and, to some extent, spectral radius) of
a suitably defined linear operator (see Proposition 1 and Remarks 1-2 in Bloise and
Calciano [8]), the latter being suitable for direct applications in empirical studies.
The parameter (ρ− 1) represents an appropriate estimation of (an upper bound
on) the implicit average real rate of interest in the long-run.
11
Prices fulfilling the Modified Cass Criterion might be regarded as involving low
interest rates. Prices exhibit high interest rates, according to the terminology borne
out by Alvarez and Jermann [5], when they are summable, that is,∑
σ∈S
pσ is finite.
Clearly, high interest rates are inconsistent with the Modified Cass Criterion. Fi-
nally, prices involve neither high nor low interest rates when they neither satisfy the
Modified Cass Criterion nor are summable. The latter circumstance reveals a null
interest rate in the long period and corresponds to a golden rule in the terminol-
ogy for overlapping generations economies. High interest rates, in turn, guarantee a
finite pricing of all intertemporal consumption profiles, so preserving the duality be-
tween commodity and price spaces. As our characterization of inefficiency exploits
low interest rates, prices are consistent with an efficient allocation of resources even
when not involving high interest rates and, hence, an infinite value of the aggregate
endowment.
In the formulation of Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15], when repudiating their debt,
individuals are not excluded by participation into financial markets, though they
are not allowed to hold liabilities anymore. Debt constraints are determined so as
to prevent individuals from default and to sustain self-enforcing private debt. The
characterization of Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15] shows that debt is self-enforcing if
and only if debt constraints allow for exact roll-over, that is, in our notation, at
every non-initial date-event σ in S,∑
τ∈σ+
pτfτ = pσfσ.
As debt constraints need be bounded, exact roll-over implies that prices never
involve high interest rates. Our Modified Cass Criterion is of particular relevance
in this situation.
We begin with proving sufficiency of the Modified Cass Criterion.
Proposition 4 (Sufficiency). An interior allocation x in X, with non-trivially
supporting price p in P , is constrained inefficient if there exists a non-null positive
element v of L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
The logic underlying welfare improvement is extremely simple. For an elemen-
tary illustration, suppose that there is no uncertainty (that is, S can be identified
with T ). By hypothesis, all consumption plans are interior and, at every date-
event, at least one individual is unconstrained (that is, has a subjective evaluation
of transfers to the following period coinciding with the market evaluation). Thus,
at every period t in T , for some unconstrained individual i in J , the modification
of consumptions, described by(
xit, x
i
t+1
) 7→ (xit − vt, xit+1 + vt+1) ,
induces a first-order effect on welfare that can be estimated as
−pitvt + pit+1vt+1 =
(
pit
pt
)
(−ptvt + pt+1vt+1) ≥
(
1− ρ
ρ
)
pitvt.
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This estimate exploits the fact that, for an unconstrained individual, subjective
and market evaluations coincide. By iterating this sort of transfers across periods of
trade, the final redistribution yields a positive first-order effect on utilities beginning
from every period. As second-order effects are uniformly bounded, smoothness
suffices to prove a welfare improvement beginning from all date-events.
We now prove necessity of the Modified Cass Criterion. This requires a strength-
ening of inefficiency to capture non-vanishing benefits from the redistribution across
periods of trade. As mentioned earlier, this sort of strong inefficiency corresponds
to inefficiency of positive measure according to Debreu’s [12] coefficient of resource
utilization.
Proposition 5 (Necessity). An interior allocation x in X, with supporting price
p in P , is constrained inefficient only if there exists a non-null positive element v
of L satisfying, at every σ in S, ∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
In addition, it is strongly constrained inefficient only if there exists a non-null
positive element v of L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
Necessity is also straightforwardly explained. For every individual i in S, at
every date-event σ in S, ∑
τ∈σ+
piτv
i
τ + p
i
σ
(
ziσ − xiσ
)
= piσv
i
σ.
Here, vi in L represents the subjectively evaluated (first-order) benefit, in terms
of current consumption, from the redistribution. This benefit needs be positive at
all date-events. Thus, exploiting the fact that subjective evaluation cannot exceed
market evaluation (foc-1)-(foc-2), at every date-event σ in S,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ +
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ viσ.
Only market prices appear in this inequality. Aggregating across individuals,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
∑
i∈J
viτ +
∑
i∈J
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥∑
i∈J
viσ.
Feasibility proves the claim, as the aggregate subjectively evaluated benefit
∑
i∈J v
i
in L satisfies ∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
∑
i∈J
viτ ≥ pσ
∑
i∈J
viσ.
Finally, the strong form of inefficiency allows for a small uniform contraction pre-
serving increasing subjectively evaluated gains from the redistribution.
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7. Consistent Debt Constraints
We here verify to which extent our characterization is preserved under the no-
tion of constrained inefficiency at given reservation utilities, rather than at planned
consumptions. This allows for a direct comparison with the characterization pro-
vided by Alvarez and Jermann [5]. In addition, it provides insights into constrained
inefficiency at equilibrium with self-enforcing debt as in Hellwig and Lorenzoni [15].
Sufficiency is obviously unaltered. If planned consumptions are individually ra-
tional at some given reservation utilities, any welfare improving reallocation guar-
anteeing sequential participation at planned consumptions is a fortiori a welfare
improving reallocation guaranteeing sequential participation at the given reserva-
tion utilities.
Proposition 6 (Sufficiency with consistent debt constraints). Given reservation
utilities ν in V , an interior allocation x in Xpc (ν), with non-trivially supporting
price p in P , is constrained inefficient at reservation utilities ν in V if there exists
a non-null positive element v of L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
As far as necessity is concerned, we preliminarily add restrictions on debt con-
straints consistent with Alvarez and Jermann’s [5] and Hellwig and Lorenzoni’s [15]
formulations. Given reservation utilities ν in V , an allocation x in Xpc (ν) is sup-
ported by price p in P at debt constraints consistent with reservation utilities ν in
V if it is supported by price p in P at debt constraints f in F satisfying, for every
individual i in J , at every non-initial date-event σ in S,
(dc) U iσ
(
xi
)− νiσ > 0 only if f iσ > 0.
The underlying logic of this notion is that, whenever subjective welfare exceeds
reservation utility at some date-event, debt constrains allow for borrowing at that
date-event, that is, for (locally) unrestricted participation into financial markets.
Proposition 7 (Necessity with consistent debt constraints). Given reservation
utilities ν in V , an interior allocation x in Xpc (ν), with supporting price p in
P at debt constraints consistent with reservation utilities ν in V , is constrained
inefficient at reservation utilities ν in V only if there exists a non-null positive
element v of L satisfying, at every σ in S,∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
In addition, it is strongly constrained inefficient at reservation utilities ν in V only
if there exists a non-null positive element v of L satisfying, for some 1 > ρ > 0, at
every σ in S,
ρ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ pσvσ.
The proof of this claim requires a minor amendment of the previous argument
for necessity (proposition 5). For an individual i in J , the subjectively evaluated
benefit from the redistribution vi in L need not be positive at all date-events, though
it is positive at the initial date-event. (Indeed, at some non-initial date-event,
subjective welfare might fall below utility at planned consumptions.) However,
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notice that, when an individual is constrained in transferring resources at a date-
event, consistent debt constraints ensure that the individual will positively benefit,
with respect to planned consumptions, from the redistribution at that date-event.
Hence, for every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ +
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ viσ.
The argument then unfolds as in the proof of proposition 5, using only the non-null
positive part of aggregate subjectively evaluated benefit
∑
i∈J v
i in L.
Loosely interpreted, our complete characterization proves that constrained inef-
ficiency at initial endowments (that is, constrained inefficiency as defined by Kehoe
and Levine [16] and Alvarez and Jermann [5]) coincides with low interest rates.
Alvarez and Jermann [5] show, on the one side, that every equilibrium allocation
involving high interest rates is constrained efficient (Corollary 4.7) and, on the other
side, that every non-autarchic constrained efficient allocation involves high interest
rates (Proposition 4.10). Therefore, according to Alvarez and Jermann [5], high
interest rates fully characterize non-autarchic constrained efficiency. What about
neither high nor low interest rates, that is, a null interest rate over the long period?
In appendix A, we provide an example of a non-autarchic equilibrium with not-
too-tight debt constraints that it is constrained efficient at the initial allocation
and it involves a constant null interest rate. This example, though it requires
non-stationary initial endowments, shows that a null interest rate over the long
period can be sustained at non-autarchic equilibrium with not-too-tight debt con-
straints. In turn, non-stationary endowments might be of interest for applications
to the sustainability of sovereign debt, when some countries face a decline, or a
deindustrialization, and some other countries an expansion, or an industrialization.
Consistently, our characterization is tight.
In appendix B, we also complement Kehoe and Levine’s [16] and Alvarez and
Jermann’s [5] Second Welfare Theorem in order to prove that, when both con-
sumptions and endowments are stationary, a non-autarchic constrained optimum
requires high interest rates. As a conclusion, limiting attention to non-autarchic
stationary consumptions, constrained efficiency at initial stationary endowments is
fully characterized by high interest rates.
8. Conclusion
We have shown that the Modified Cass Criterion fully reveals constrained inef-
ficiency at equilibrium with any sort of debt constraints, when constrained ineffi-
ciency corresponds to the occurrence of a feasible welfare improvement beginning
from every contingency. When debt constraints are specified consistently with some
reservation utilities, an analogous characterization emerges, when constrained in-
efficiency coincides with a feasible ex-ante welfare improvement subject to partici-
pation constrains at the given reservation utilities. This shows that the nature of
constrained inefficiency at equilibrium with consistent debt constraints is basically
that captured by our notion of constrained inefficiency, that is, a recursively feasible
welfare improvement.
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Appendix A. Example
In this appendix, we provide an example of a constrained efficient allocation,
according to Alvarez and Jermann [5], violating the hypothesis of high interest
rates. In particular, a null interest rate sustains a stationary allocation as non-
autarchic equilibrium at not-too-tight debt constraints. Initial endowments are
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non-stationary and are constructed so as to approach the equilibrium stationary al-
location in the long period. Non-stationarity of either endowments or consumptions
is necessary for a non-autarchic constrained optimum not to involve high interest
rates, as shown in appendix B.
Before presenting the example, we shall produce necessary conditions for con-
strained inefficiency. To simplify, we shall assume that there is no uncertainty,
that is, S can be identified with T ; also, that there is a common discount factor,
1 > δ > 0, and that the common per-period utility function u : R+ → R is smooth
on R+ (that is, to be precise, it can be extended as a twice continuously differ-
entiable function on some open set containing R+); finally, that u′ (1) < δu′ (0).
Recall that, given an initial allocation e in X, an interior allocation x in Xpc (e) is
supported by price p in P at not-too-tight debt constraints with respect to initial
allocation e in X if it is supported by price p in P such that, for every individual i
in J , at every t in T ,
(foc-1)
pt+1
pt
≥ p
i
t+1
pit
and
(foc-2)
pt+1
pt
=
pit+1
pit
if U it+1
(
xi
)− U it+1 (ei) > 0,
where pi in P i is the subjective price at interior consumption plan xi in Xi.
Claim 1 (Constrained inefficiency). Given an initial allocation e in X, an interior
allocation x in Xpc (e), with supporting price p in P at not-too-tight debt constraints
with respect to initial allocation e in X, is Pareto dominated by an allocation z
in Xpc (e), satisfying
∑
i∈J z
i ≤ ∑i∈J xi, only if there exists a strictly positive
element v of L satisfying, for some sufficiently small ² > 0, at every t in T ,
pt+1
pt
vt+1 ≥ vt + ²
∑
i∈J
(
zit − xit
)2
and ∑
s∈T
δs
∑
i∈J
∣∣zit+s − xit+s∣∣ ≥ ²vt.
Proof of claim 1. Preliminarily observe that, for consumptions varying in a com-
pact interval of R+, there exists a sufficiently small ² > 0 satisfying
u (c′)− u (c) ≤ u′ (c) (c′ − c)− ²u′ (c) (c′ − c)2 .
This shows a sort of quadratic concavity of intertemporal utility.
For every individual i in J , at every t in T , define
vit =
1
pit
∑
s∈T
pit+s
(
zit+s − xit+s
)− ² 1
pit
∑
s∈T
pit+s
(
zit+s − xit+s
)2
.
Notice that, for every individual i in J , vi is an element of L. Define v =∑i∈J vi,
an element itself of L, and observe that, by Pareto dominance and quadratic con-
cavity, v0 =
∑
i∈J v
i
0 > 0. In addition, at every t in T ,
1
²
∑
i∈J
∑
s∈T
δs
∣∣zit+s − xit+s∣∣ ≥∑
i∈J
1
pit
∑
s∈T
pit+s
∣∣zit+s − xit+s∣∣ ≥ vt,
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where the first inequality, as ² > 0 can be assumed to be arbitrarily small, follows
from bounded derivatives of per-period utility u : R+ → R over a compact interval
of R+.
For every individual i in J , at every t in T ,
pit+1
pit
vit+1 +
(
zit − xit
) ≥ vit + ² (zit − xit)2 .
As debt constraints are not-too-tight,
pt+1
pt
>
pit+1
pit
only if U it+1
(
xi
)− U it+1 (ei) = 0.
Hence, as U it+1
(
zi
) − U it+1 (xi) ≥ 0, vit+1 ≥ 0. We consistently conclude that, for
every individual i in J , at every t in T ,
pt+1
pt
vit+1 +
(
zit − xit
) ≥ vit + ² (zit − xit)2 .
Aggregating across individuals, by feasibility, this proves our claim. ¤
For the example, it suffices to consider only two individuals, J = {e, o}, asso-
ciated with even, e, and odd, o, periods of trade. Let xe > 0 and xo > 0 satisfy
xe + xo = 1 and
(ss) u′ (xe) = δu′ (xo) .
Allocation x in X is given by
xe = (xe, xo, xe, xo, . . .) ,
xo = (xo, xe, xo, xe, . . .) .
At allocation x in X, the supporting price p in P is
(pt)t∈T = (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1, . . .) ,
whereas the subjective price pi in P i of individual i in J is given by(
pit
)
t∈T =
(
δtu′
(
xit
))
t∈T .
We need to construct initial endowments e in X which are consistent with price
support at not-too-tight debt constraints.
Claim 2 (Not-too-tight debt constraints). There exists an initial allocation e in
X, satisfying
∑
i∈J x
i =
∑
i∈J e
i, such that allocation x in Xpc (e) is supported by
price p in P at not-too-tight debt constraints with respect to initial allocation e in
X.
Proof of claim 2. Consider the (local) difference equation
(*) h (ξt, ξt+1) = u (xe) + δu (xo)− u (xe + ξt)− δu (xo − ξt+1) = 0.
It is easy to verify that this difference equation admits a strictly positive solution
(ξt)t∈T in L satisfying limt∈T ξt = 0. (Indeed, observe that ξ > 0 implies h (ξ, ξ) > 0
and h (ξ, 0) < 0, so that h (ξ, ξ′) = 0 for some ξ > ξ′ > 0 by the Intermediate Value
Theorem.) Endowments e in X are given by
ee = (xe + ξ0, xo − ξ1, xe + ξ2, xo − ξ3, . . .) ,
eo = (xo − ξ0, xe + ξ1, xo − ξ2, xe + ξ3, . . .) .
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In addition, because of restriction (*), at every t in {0, 2, 4, . . .},
Uet (x
e) = Uet (e
e)
and
Uot (x
o) ≥ u (xo) + δUot+1 (xo) > u (xo − ξt) + δUot+1 (eo) ≥ Uot (eo) ;
at every t in {1, 3, 5, . . .},
Uot (x
o) = Uot (e
o)
and
Uet (x
e) ≥ u (xo) + δUet+1 (xe) > u (xo − ξt) + δUet+1 (ee) ≥ Uet (ee) .
This suffices to prove the claim. ¤
We now conclude that allocation x in X is a constrained optimum at initial
allocation e in X.
Claim 3 (Constrained optimum). Given the constructed initial allocation e in X,
allocation x in Xpc (e) is not Pareto dominated by an alternative allocation z in
Xpc (e) satisfying
∑
i∈J z
i ≤∑i∈J xi.
Proof of claim 3. Supposing not, because of claim 2, we can apply the character-
ization of claim 1. Exploiting the stationarity of supporting price p in P , this
characterization imposes the existence of a strictly positive element v of L satisfy-
ing, for some sufficiently small ² > 0, at every t in T ,
(*) vt+1 ≥ vt + ²
∑
i∈J
(
zit − xit
)2
and
(**)
∑
s∈T
δs
∑
i∈J
∣∣zit+s − xit+s∣∣ ≥ ²vt.
Clearly, the sequence (vt)t∈T in L converges, so that condition (*) yields
lim
t∈T
vt+1 ≥ v0 + ²
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈J
(
zit − xit
)2
.
Therefore,
lim
t∈T
∑
i∈J
∣∣zit − xit∣∣ = 0.
This is inconsistent with condition (**) as the sequence (vt)t∈T in L is (weakly)
increasing. ¤
Summing up, we have provided an example of a constrained optimum, according
to Alvarez and Jermann [5], which is not autarchic and does not involve high
interest rates, as supporting prices exhibit a null interest rate. It is to be remarked
that, strictu sensu, this is not a counter-example to Proposition 4.10 of Alvarez
and Jermann [5], as they also assume stationary endowments, though, in the proof,
stationarity of endowments seems not being exploited.
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Appendix B. Second Welfare Theorem
We here provide a version of the Second Welfare Theorem as in Kehoe and
Levine [16, Proposition 5]. The Second Welfare Theorem of Kehoe and Levine [16]
is exploited by Alvarez and Jermann [5, Proposition 4.10] to prove necessity of high
interest rates at non-autarchic constrained efficient allocations.
Given an initial allocation e in X, an allocation x in Xpc (e) is an abstract
equilibrium with transfers at initial allocation e in X if there exists a positive linear
functional ϕ on L such that, given any allocation z in Xpc (e), for every individual
i in J ,
U i
(
zi
)− U i (xi) > 0 implies ϕ · (zi − xi) > 0.
Claim 4 (Second Welfare Theorem under Stationarity). In a stationary economy,
given a stationary allocation e in X, a stationary interior allocation x in Xpc (e),
satisfying ∑
i∈J
xi −
∑
i∈J
ei = 0
and
(sw)
∑
i∈J
U iσ
(
xi
)−∑
i∈J
U iσ
(
ei
)
> 0 at every σ ∈ S,
is not constrained inefficient at initial allocation e in X only if it is an abstract
equilibrium with transfers at initial allocation e in X.
Proof of claim 4. By the Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see Kehoe and Levine
[16]), there exists a non-null positive linear functional ϕ on L such that, for every
allocation z in Xpc (e) that (weakly) Pareto dominates allocation x in X,∑
i∈J
ϕ · (zi − xi) ≥ 0.
Clearly, by positivity of the supporting linear functional, ϕ · u > 0, where u is any
interior positive element of L. We shall prove that the linear functional ϕ on L is
strictly positive (that is, for every non-null positive element v of L, ϕ · v > 0). By
canonical arguments, this suffices to prove the claim.
Assuming not, then there exists v > 0 in L such that ϕ · v = 0 and, for all but
finitely many σ in S, vσ = 0. For any sufficiently small 1 > λ > 0, consider the
interior allocation z in X that is defined, for every individual i in J , by
zi = (1− λ)xi + λei + v.
By strict monotonicity and strict convexity of preferences, allocation z lies in
Xpc (e). In addition, by strict monotonicity and continuity of preferences, allo-
cation z in X strictly Pareto dominates allocation x in X, provided that 1 > λ > 0
is sufficiently small. Also, consider the collection
(Pi)
i∈J determined, for every
individual i in J , by Pi = {σ ∈ S : U iσ (zi)− U iσ (ei) > 0}. Notice that, by sta-
tionarity, provided that 1 > λ > 0 is sufficiently small, it can be assumed that,
for every individual i in J , {σ ∈ S : U iσ (xi)− U iσ (ei) > 0} ⊂ Pi, so that, using
condition (sw),
(*)
⋃
i∈J
Pi = S.
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Finally, observe that, as v in L vanishes at all but finitely many date-events σ in
S, for every individual i in J , the map
σ 7→ (ziτ)τ∈S(σ)
is measurable with respect to some finite partition of S.
By the last observation, there exists 1 > θ > 0 such that the alternative interior
allocation y in X, defined, for every individual i in J , by
yi = zi − θ
∑
σ∈Pi
xiσ,
lies in Xpc (e) and Pareto dominates allocation x in X. (Here, to simplify notation,
we use the decomposition RS = ⊕σ∈SRσ.) Hence,
(#J )ϕ · v − θϕ ·
∑
i∈J
∑
σ∈Pi
xiσ ≥ ϕ ·
(∑
i∈J
yi −
∑
i∈J
xi
)
≥ 0,
that is,
0 ≥
(
#J
θ
)
ϕ · v ≥ ϕ ·
∑
i∈J
∑
σ∈Pi
xiσ.
Observing that allocation x in X is interior and that condition (*) holds, this is a
contradiction, as ϕ · u > 0 for every interior positive element u of L. ¤
Appendix C. Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. The stationary allocation x in X is Pareto dominated by
an alternative stationary allocation z in X satisfying∑
i∈J
zi ≤
∑
i∈J
xi.
At no loss of generality, for every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
U iσ
(
zi
)− U iσ (xi) = 0 implies (ziτ)τ∈S(σ) = (xiτ)τ∈S(σ) .
(Indeed, if not, by strict convexity of preferences, one could use, for some sufficiently
large 1 > λ > 0, the alternative stationary allocation λ (z − x) + x in X.) For an
individual i in S, let F i be the set consisting of all date-events σ in S such that
U iσ
(
zi
)− U iσ (xi) > 0.
For some 1 > λ > 0, define an alternative allocation y in X by setting, for every
individual i in J ,
yi = zi − λ
∑
σ∈Fi
ziσ.
(For notational convenience, we use the decomposition RS = ⊕σ∈SRσ.) By station-
arity of preferences, there exists a sufficiently small 1 > λ > 0 preserving welfare
improvement. (This is so because stationarity requires to satisfy welfare improve-
ment for finitely many continuous utility functions.) By interiority of allocation x
in X, strong constrained inefficiency obtains at the subtree
F =
⋃
i∈J
F i.
This proves the claim. ¤
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Proof of proposition 2. As consumption plan xi in Xi is optimal in the budget set
Bip
(
ei, gi
)
, for some financial plan vi in V i
(
gi
)
, at every date-event σ in S,
(*)
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ + pσ
(
xiσ − eiσ
)
= pσviσ.
Consider debt constraints f i = vi + gi in F i, which are positive as vi is in V i
(
gi
)
.
Suppose that consumption plan zi in Xi lies in the budget set Bip
(
xi, f i
)
. It follows
that, for some financial plan wi in V i
(
f i
)
, at every date-event σ in S,∑
τ∈σ+
pτw
i
τ + pσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ pσwiσ.
Hence, at every date-event σ in S,
−
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ +
∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
(
wiτ + v
i
τ
)
+ pσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ pσ (wiσ + viσ)− pσviσ.
That is, using condition (*),∑
τ∈σ+
pτ
(
wiτ + v
i
τ
)
+ pσ
(
ziσ − eiσ
) ≤ pσ (wiσ + viσ) .
In addition, as wi lies in V i
(
f i
)
, financial plan wi + vi is an element of V i
(
gi
)
.
It follows that consumption plan zi in Xi belongs to the budget set Bip
(
ei, gi
)
, so
proving the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 3. Necessity of this first-order characterization is established
by Alvarez and Jermann [5]. To prove sufficiency, for an individual i in J , observe
that consumption plan xi lies in the budget set Bip
(
xi, f i
)
and consider any con-
sumption plan zi in the budget set Bip
(
xi, f i
)
. It follows that, for some financial
plan vi in V i
(
f i
)
, at every date-event σ in S,
−piσ
∑
τ∈σ+
(
pτ
pσ
)
f iτ + p
i
σ
∑
τ∈σ+
(
pτ
pσ
)(
viτ + f
i
τ
)
+ piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ piσviσ,
where pi in P i is the subjective price at consumption plan xi in Xi. Using condition
(foc-1), along with the fact that vi lies in V i
(
f i
)
, this yields
−piσ
∑
τ∈σ+
(
pτ
pσ
)
f iτ +
∑
τ∈σ+
piτ
(
viτ + f
i
τ
)
+ piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ piσviσ.
Using condition (foc-2), this finally becomes
−
∑
τ∈σ+
piτf
i
τ +
∑
τ∈σ+
piτ
(
viτ + f
i
τ
)
+ piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ piσ (viσ + f iσ)− piσf iσ.
Adding up, one obtains
−
∑
σ∈St
∑
τ∈σ+
piτf
i
τ +
∑
σ∈St
piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ 0,
where, for every t in T , St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) = t} and St = {σ ∈ S : t (σ) ≤ t}.
Observing that debt-constrains f in F are bounded and subjective price pi in P i
defines an order-continuous linear functional on L,∑
σ∈S
piσ
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≤ 0.
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This, because of (sp), suffices to prove the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 4. At no loss of generality, as x in X is an interior allocation,
it can be assumed that ∧
i∈J
xi ≥ v.
Consider a partition
(Pi)
i∈J of the set of non-initial date-events in S such that,
for every non-initial date-event σ in S, σ belongs to Pi only if f iσ > 0. This
construction is consistent as price support is non-trivial. Also, for every individual
i in J , let N i = {σ ∈ S : σ+ ∩ Pi 6= ∅}. Finally, for every date-event σ in S, define
Pi (σ) = Pi ∩ S (σ) and N i (σ) = N i ∩ S (σ).
For every individual i in J , define
zi = xi +
∑
σ∈Pi
vσ −
∑
σ∈N i
(∑
τ∈σ+∩Pi pτvτ∑
τ∈σ+ pτvτ
)
vσ.
(For notational convenience, we use the decomposition RS = ⊕σ∈SRσ.) For every
individual i in J , the underlying redistribution increases consumption at date-
events in Pi and decreases consumption at date-events in N i. Clearly, z in X is a
feasible allocation, that is, it satisfies (cf). Also, notice that, by construction, for
every individual i in J , at every date-event σ in S,∑
ν∈N i(σ)
(∑
τ∈ν+∩Pi pτvτ∑
τ∈ν+ pτvτ
)
piνvν ≤
∑
ν∈N i(σ)
piν
(
pνvν∑
τ∈ν+ pτvτ
)
1
pν
∑
τ∈ν+∩Pi
pτvτ
≤
∑
ν∈N i(σ)
(
pνvν∑
τ∈ν+ pτvτ
) ∑
τ∈ν+∩Pi
piτvτ
≤ ρ
∑
ν∈N i(σ)
∑
τ∈ν+∩Pi
piτvτ
≤ ρ
∑
τ∈Pi(σ)
piτvτ .
The first inequality is a simple manipulation; the second inequality uses the fact that
subjective and market evaluations coincide; the third inequality is a consequence
of the Modified Cass Criterion; the last inequality uses the construction of subsets
Pi and N i of S. Hence, for every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
(*)
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
) ≥ (1− ρ) ∑
τ∈Pi(σ)
piτvτ ≥ (1− ρ)
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
)+
.
Manipulating inequality (*), we obtain∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
) ≥ (1− ρ
ρ
) ∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
)− ≥ (1− ρ) ∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
)−
.
Hence, for every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
(**)
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
) ≥ (1− ρ
2
) ∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
∣∣ziτ − xiτ ∣∣ .
Condition (**) guarantees a first-order positive welfare effect beginning from ev-
ery date-event σ in S. To obtain a welfare improvement, we show that higher order
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effects are uniformly bounded. As allocation x in X is interior, for a sufficiently
small ² > 0, any allocation y in B² (x) is also interior, where
B² (x) =
{
y ∈ X :
∑
i∈J
∥∥yi − xi∥∥ ≤ ²} .
Notice that per-period utility ui : R+ → R exhibits a bounded second-order term
over any compact interval in R++. Thus, it can be assumed that there exists
a sufficiently large µ > 0 satisfying, given any allocation y in B² (x), for every
individual i in J , at every σ in S,
ui
(
yiσ
)− ui (xiσ) ≥ ∂ui (xiσ) (yiσ − xiσ)− (µ2) ∣∣yiσ − xiσ∣∣ ∂ui (xiσ) ∣∣yiσ − xiσ∣∣ .
Also, possibly contracting v in L, at no loss of generality,∨
i∈J
∥∥zi − xi∥∥ ≤ ‖v‖ ≤ ² ∧ (1− ρ
µ
)
.
Hence, for every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
ui
(
ziσ
)− ui (xiσ) ≥ ∂ui (xiσ) (ziσ − xiσ)− (1− ρ2
)
∂ui
(
xiσ
) ∣∣ziσ − xiσ∣∣ .
This, because of condition (**), shows weak Pareto dominance. By strict convexity
of preferences, this suffices to prove the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 5. As allocation z lies in Xpc (x), for every individual i in J ,
at every σ in S,
viσ =
1
piσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
) ≥ 0.
In addition, v =
∑
i∈J v
i is a non-null positive element of RS , as welfare is higher
for at least one individual at some date-event. By feasibility and the bound on
subjective prices (ui), as a matter of fact, for every individual i in J , vi is a
positive element of L and, across individuals, v is a non-null positive element of L.
Observe that, by construction, for every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
1
piσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piτv
i
τ +
(
ziσ − xiσ
)
= viσ.
By first-order conditions (foc-1)-(foc-2) and the positivity of vi in L,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ +
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ viσ.
Summing among individuals,
(*)
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ +
∑
i∈J
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ vσ.
We here distinguish two cases.
Assuming constrained inefficiency, condition (*) delivers, at every date-event σ
in S,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ vσ.
This proves the claim.
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Assuming strongly constrained inefficiency, observe that, at every σ in S, vσ > 0
only if σ belongs to F . (Indeed, if σ is not in F , then, for every individual i in J ,(
ziτ
)
τ∈S(σ) =
(
xiτ
)
τ∈S(σ)
and, hence, viσ = 0.) Therefore, as v is a bounded element in L, for some sufficiently
large 1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in F ,
² ≥
(
1− ρ
ρ
)
vσ.
Hence, condition (*) delivers, at every date-event σ in F ,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ vσ + ² ≥
(
1
ρ
)
vσ.
Finally, at every date-event σ in (S/F), condition (*) delivers
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ ≥ 0 ≥
(
1
ρ
)
vσ.
This proves the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 6. By proposition 4, allocation x in X is constrained inefficient
at initial allocation x in X. As allocation x lies in Xpc (e), this simple observation
suffices to prove the claim. ¤
Proof of proposition 7. For every individual i in J , define, at every date-event σ in
S,
viσ =
1
piσ
∑
τ∈S(σ)
piτ
(
ziτ − xiτ
)
.
By Pareto dominance, at the initial date-event φ in S, ∑i∈J viφ > 0. In addition,
as allocation x in X is interior, by uniform impatience (ui), for every individual i
in J , vi is an element of L. In addition, for every individual i in J , at every σ in
S,
(*)
1
piσ
∑
τ∈σ+
piτv
i
τ +
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ viσ.
For every individual i in J , at every σ in S,
viσ < 0 implies U
i
σ
(
zi
)− U iσ (xi) < 0.
Therefore, as allocation z lies in Xpc (ν),
viσ < 0 implies U
i
σ
(
xi
)− νiσ > 0.
Using the consistency requirement (dc), this yields
viσ < 0 implies f
i
σ > 0.
Hence, by first-order conditions (foc-1)-(foc-2), inequality (*) delivers, for every
individual i in J , at every σ in S,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
i
τ +
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ viσ.
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Summing up across individuals,
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτvτ +
∑
i∈J
(
ziσ − xiσ
) ≥ vσ.
We only consider the case of strongly constrained inefficiency, as the proof for simply
constrained inefficiency is analogous.
The positive part v+ of v in L is a non-null positive element of L. At a date-event
σ in S, if v+σ > 0, then σ in an element of F . Hence, for some sufficiently large
1 > ρ > 0, at every σ in S,
² ≥
(
1− ρ
ρ
)
v+σ .
Therefore, at a date-event σ in S, if v+σ > 0, then
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
+
τ ≥ v+σ + ² ≥
(
1
ρ
)
v+σ .
In addition, at a date-event σ in S, if v+σ = 0, then
1
pσ
∑
τ∈σ+
pτv
+
τ ≥ 0 ≥
(
1
ρ
)
v+σ .
This suffices to prove the claim. ¤
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